Abstract-Chameleon hash functions are trapdoor one-way functions with many applications such as chameleon signatures and on-line/off-line signatures. Previous research focused on the concrete constructions based on different assumptions, as well as schemes without the key-exposure problem. In this paper, we consider the structure-preserving schemes where messages, hash value and public keys all consist of elements of a group over which a bilinear map is efficiently computable. This property makes them useful in cryptographic protocols as they can nicely compose with other algebraic tools (like the GrothSahai proof systems). We first propose a concrete structurepreserving chameleon hash from a one-time linearly homomorphic Structure-Preserving Signature (SPS), without the keyexposure free property. Then, we give a generic construction of chameleon hash from any linearly homomorphic SPS satisfying a certain template, and key-exposure freeness can be achieved when full-fledged linearly homomorphic SPS is used.
I. INTRODUCTION
Chameleon hash functions, first introduced by Krawczyk and Rabin [1] , are trapdoor one-way hash nfunctions which prevent everyone except the holder of the trapdoor information from computing collisions for a random given input.
Chameleon hash functions were originally used to design chameleon signatures, which is constructed based on the well established hash-and-sign paradigm and the chameleon hash functions are used to compute the cryptographic message digest. Chameleon signatures simultaneously provide the properties of non-repudiation and non-transferability for the signed message as undeniable signatures do, but the former allows for simpler and more efficient realization than the latter. In Corresponding author email: chunhuiwu@163.com. particular, chameleon signatures are non-interactive and less complicated. Chameleon hash functions were also used by Shamir and Tauman to construct much more efficient online/offline signature schemes generically [2] , based on the "hash-sign-switch" paradigm, while Even, Goldreich and Micali's original general method for converting any signature scheme into an on-line/off-line signature scheme is not practical because it increases the size of the signature by a quadratic factor. On-line/off-line signature performs the signature generating procedure in two phases. The first phase is performed off-line (without knowing the signed message) and the second phase is performed online (after knowing the signed message). The results of the precomputation in the off-line phase are saved and then used in the on-line phase when a message must be signed.
One limitation of the original chameleon hashing [1] is the key-exposure problem, firstly addressed by Ateniese and de Medeiros [3] in Financial Cryptography 2004. In these chameleon hashing, the trapdoor key will be exposed by a pair of hash collisions. If key-exposure chameleon hashing is used in chameleon signatures, the recipient will have strong disincentive to forge signatures and partially undermining the concept of nontransferability, because signature forgery results in the signer recovering the recipient's trapdoor information and he can then use it to deny other signatures given to the recipient. In the worst case, the signer could collaborate with other individuals to invalidate any signatures which were designated to be verified by the same public key. If key-exposure chameleon hashing is used in online/offline signatures, we have to compute a chameleon hash and the corresponding chameleon signature as the signature stamp for every signed message. This is a computation and storage overload of on-line/off-line signatures.
Linearly Homomorphic Structurepreserving Signatures. The notion of linearly homomorphic structure-preserving signatures [4] is the combination of linearly homomorphic signatures and Structure-Preserving Signatures (SPS). These signature schemes function exactly like ordinary homomorphic signatures with the addition restriction that signatures and messages only consist of (vectors of) group elements whose discrete logarithms may not be available.
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A. Our Contributions
There is no direct construction of chameleon hashing from one-time signature, so it is interesting to find out the generic construction in this paper. 1) A general construction of one-time signature from chameleon hashing is known in [5] , but not the inverse. 2) Constructions of chameleon hash from signature schemes are only known for signature schemes admitting an efficient protocol [6] . Furthermore, the construction does not readily extend to hash to vectors.
3) Another challenge is to construct constant-size mchameleon hash to many group elements at once, if we disregard the trivial solution of hashing the message first, which is not an option when we want to allow for efficient proofs of knowledge of the message.
In this paper, We first propose a concrete construction of structure-preserving chameleon hashing from a onetime linearly homomorphic SPS in [4] . It is proved to be secure based on the unforgeability of the underlying homomorphic signature scheme, without the keyexposure free property. We then generalize our results and give a generic construction of structure-preserving chameleon hashing from any linearly homomorphic SPS satisfying the template described in Section II-D. The generic construction yields constant-size chameleon hash to vectors of group elements without using protocols. Since the importance of key-exposure freeness in some applications of chameleon hashing, such as chameleon signatures, on-line/off-line signatures and handoff authentication schemes [7] , many concrete key-exposure free chameleon hashing schemes based on different assumptions were proposed after the key-exposure problem was addressed. We further prove that our generic construction is key-exposure free when a full-fledged linearly homomorphic SPS is used. So our construction satisfies all the desired security requirements, which is suitable in various applications of chameleon settings.
B. Related Work
Trapdoor Commitment. Trapdoor commitment schemes, introduced as early as 1988 [8] , are closely mrelated to chameleon hashes. But as stated in [3] , the two notions are not truly equivalent. Specifically, Ateniese and de Medeiros identified four categories of commitments, which have all different degrees of suitability for use as a chameleon hashing scheme.
Homomorphic Commitment. Homomorphic cryptosystems such as [9] or Linear Encryption [10] can be seen as homomorphic commitment schemes that are perfectly binding and computationally hiding. Commitments based on homomorphic encryption can be converted into computationally binding and perfectly hiding homomorphic commitments, see for instance the mixed commitments of Damg ard and Nielsen [11] . But even in the perfectly hiding versions of these schemes the size of a commitment is larger than the size of a message. This length increase follows from the fact that the underlying building block is a cryptosystem whose ciphertexts must be large enough to include the message.
There are also direct constructions of homomorphic trapdoor commitment schemes such as Guillou and Quisquater commitments [12] and Pedersen commitments [13] . They are perfectly hiding and computationally binding based on the discrete-logarithm problem. However, none of the previous trapdoor commitment schemes has messages from a group.
Libert and Peters et al. [4] showed that linearly homomorphic SPS schemes generically yield a simulationsound trapdoor commitment [14] . The scheme satisfies the property of length-reducing. The trivial solution of length-increasing consisting of hashing the message first, which is not an option when we want to allow for efficient proofs of knowledge of an opening.
Key-Exposure Free Chameleon Hashing. Ateniese and de Medeiros [3] first introduced the idea of identity-based chameleon hashing to solve the keyexposure problem. Due to the distinguishing property of identity-based system, the signer can sign a message to an intended recipient, without having to first retrieve the recipient's certificate. Moreover, the signer uses a different identity for each transaction with a recipient, so that signature forgery only results in the signer recovering the trapdoor information associated to a single transaction. Therefore, the signer will not be capable of denying signatures on any message in other transactions. Later, if the recipient wishes to forge the signature, it suffices for him to communicate with the trusted authority (of the identitybased scheme) to recover the trapdoor information associated with the transaction-specific public key. Though the trapdoor recovery is an optional step, this mextra interaction may still be too burdensome in certain applications, and therefore offering only a partial answer to the key exposure problem.
Chen et al. [15] proposed the first full construction of a key-exposure free chameleon hash function in the gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) groups with bilinear pairings. Ateniese and de Medeiros [3] then presented three keyexposure free chameleon hash functions, two based on the RSA assumption, as well as a new construction based on bilinear pairings. However, all of the above constructions are presented in the setting of certificatebased systems. Zhang et al. [16] presented two identitybased chameleon hash schemes from bilinear pairings, but neither of them is key-exposure free. As pointed out by Ateniese and de Medeiros, the single-trapdoor commitment schemes are not sufficient for the construction of key-exposure free chameleon hashing and the double-trapdoor mechanism [24] can either be used to construct an identity-based chameleon hash scheme or a key-exposure free one, but not both. Chen et al. proposed the first identity-based chameleon hash scheme without key exposure [17] Structure-Preserving Signatures. Signature schemes with the "structure-preserving" property, i.e., messages, signature components and public keys all live in a bilinear group, appeared for the first time in Groth's construction [18] of group signatures in the standard model, without the "structure-preserving" terminology. But the scheme is inefficient with signatures consisting of thousands of group elements. More efficient realizations were given by Cathalo, Libert and Yung [19] and Fuchsbauer [20] . Abe, Haralambiev and Ohkubo [21] , [22] subsequently showed how to sign messages of n group elements at once using O(1)-size signatures. Lower bounds on the size of structure-preserving signatures (SPS) were given in [23] while Abe et al. [24] provided evidence that optimally short SPS necessarily rely on interactive assumptions. The recent years, much attention was given to the notion and different types of structurepreserving signatures and their applications, more efficient constructions [25] - [32] have been studied.
Linearly Homomorphic Signatures. The concept of homomorphic signatures can be traced back to Desmedt [33] while proper definitions remained lacking until the work of Johnson et al. [34] . Since then, constructions have appeared for various kinds of homomorphisms [35] .
Linearly homomorphic signatures are an important class of homomorphic signatures for arithmetic functions, whose study was initiated by Boneh, Freeman, Katz and Waters [36] . While initially motivated by applications to network coding [36] , they are also useful in proofs of storage [37] or in verifiable computation mechanisms, when it comes to authenticate servers' computations on outsourced data.
C. Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Some definitions and hardness assumptions are given in Section II. The proposed concrete construction of chameleon hashing scheme without key-exposure free property from one-time linearly homomorphic SPS and its security analysis are given in Section III. The generic construction of (keyexposure free) chameleon hashing from any (fullfledged) linearly homomorphic SPS and its security analysis are given in Section IV. Finally, conclusions are made in Section V.
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. Definitions
Let be a configuration of (multiplicatively written) groups of prime order p over which a bilinear map is efficiently computable. We review the definition of linearly homomorphic SPS [4] [4] for the details.
Definition 2: A chameleon hash function is defined by a set of efficient algorithms (also can refer to [38] ):  : is a probabilistic algorithm that takes in a security parameter and outputs a key pair (pk, sk).  : Takes as input a hash key pk, a label , a message m and an auxiliary random parameter r and outputs a bitstring C of fixed length.  : Takes as input the trapdoor key sk associate to hash key pk, a label , a message m, and auxiliary parameter r, it outputs a second message and random parameter such that  : Takes as input the hash key pk, a label , and two pairs of a message and auxiliary random parameter and , where and computes another collision pair that also satisfies A secure chameleon hashing scheme satisfies the following properties:  Collision resistance: Without the knowledge of trapdoor key sk, there exists no efficient algorithm that given only pk , m, r, can find a second pair such that , with non-negligible probability.  Semantic security: The chameleon hash value C does not reveal anything about the possible message m that was hashed. In formal terms, let denote the entropy of a random variable X, and the entropy of the variable X given the value of a random function Y of X. Information-theoretic semantic security is the statement that the conditional entropy of the message given its chameleon hash value C equals the total entropy of the message space.  Message hiding: Assume the recipient has computed a collision using the universal forgery algorithm, i.e., a second pair s.t.
where was the original value signed. Then the signer, upon seeing the claimed values , can successfully contest this forgery by releasing a third pair , without having to reveal the original signed message. Refer to the algorithm in Def.2.  Key-Exposure Freeness: If a recipient has never computed a collision under then there is no efficient algorithm for an adversary to find a collision for a given chameleon hash value . This must remain true even if the adversary has oracle access to and is allowed polynomially many queries on triples of his choice, except that .
B. Hardness Assumptions
Our concrete instance of (key-exposure) chameleon hashing relies on the following hardness assumptions, the first of which implies the second one. (1) It is proved that the above signature scheme is unforgeable if the SDP assumption holds in [4] .
The scheme is bootstrapped to a full-fledged scheme [4] allowing us to sign an arbitrary number of linear subspaces by re-randomizing the signatures . Moreover-over Libert, Peters, Joye and Yung [4] give a template of linearly homomorphic SPS scheme which we reviewed in the next section.
D. Template of Linearly Homomorphic SPS Scheme

: given and the dimension-sion of the vectors to be signed, choose constants . Among these, and will determine the signature length while m will be the number of verification equations. Then, choose , in the group . The pub-lic key is while sk contains information about the representation of public elements w.r.t. specific bases. As a warm-up, in this section, we give a concrete construction of structure-preserving key-exposure chameleon hashing scheme, based on the one-time linearly homomorphic SPS described in Section II-C.
A. Key-Exposure Chameleon Hashing from One-Time
Linearly Homomorphic SPS Let be the one-time linearly homomorphic SPS described in Section II-C. We give a concrete construction of a keyexposure chameleon hashing as follows, where the label is set to be the empty string in all algorithms.

: given a security parameter and the dimension of the subspace to be hashed, run to obtain the hash key while the trapdoor key is . 
IV. GENERIC CONSTRUCTION OF CHAMELEON HASHING SCHEME
In this section, we propose a generic construction of chameleon hashing scheme from any linearly homomorphic SPS. Furthermore, the construction is keyexposure free when full-fledged linearly homomorphic SPS is used.
A. Generic Construction of Structure-Preserving
Chameleon Hashing Let be any linearly homomorphic SPS as described in Section IID. We give a generic construction of (key-exposure free) chameleon hashing as follows.  : Given the desired dimension , to obtain a hash key for some constants , and trapdoor key sk. 
Output a third collision , where
B. Security Analysis Theorem 2:
The generic construction of chameleon hashing proposed above enjoys all the security requirements, i.e., collision resistance, semantic security, and message hiding. Furthermore, key-exposure freeness can be archived when full-fledged homomorphic signature is used.
Proof: We omit the details of the proof of collision resistance, semantic security, and message hiding as they can follow the proof in Theorem 1.
Collision resistance. The collision resistance property is satisfied based on the unforgeability of the underlying linearly homomorphic SPS scheme.
Semantic security. To prove the semantic security, it is sufficient to show that the probability of the message conditioned on the hash value is equal to the unconditioned probability. We can follow the proof of the concrete instance in the previous section.
Message hiding. The message hiding property can be achieved using the algorithm Moreover, since there are equations with variants in (4) and (5), the entropy of the original value is unchanged by the revelation of the pairs and , i.e., So we achieve information-theoretic security of message hiding. Next, we show that our generic construction satisfies key-exposure freeness when fullfledged homomorphic signature is used.
Key-Exposure freeness. If there exists a PPT adversary that computes a collision under with non-negligible advantage, then there exists a Type I forger [4] against the signature scheme. In Type I forgery, the tag has never been used in any query to the signing oracle.
The adversary can have oracle access to on input , where
The reduction invokes its own signing oracle on the input , with .
Upon receiving the resulting signature chooses , computes and returns
Notice that and are a pair of collisions under .
Eventually, the adversary outputs a pair of collisions and of the hash value for msome tag that has never been used in any query to . We find that forms a valid homomorphic signature on the vector for the identifier . By construction, was never used in any signing query made by to its own oracle. Consequently, is indeed a Type I forger with the same advantage as V. CONCLUSION Chameleon hash functions are trapdoor one-way functions which closely related to trapdoor commitments, but the two notions are not truly equivalent. Concrete constructions of (key-exposure free) chameleon hash schemes based on different assumptions and their applications are studied in many works. In this paper, we study the relation between chameleon hashing and linearly homomorphic signatures. We first propose a concrete construction of structure-preserving chameleon hash scheme from a onetime linearly homomorphic SPS, which enjoys all basic properties but without keyexposure freeness. Then, we give a generic construction of chameleon hashing from any linearly homomorphic SPS satisfying a certain template. Moreover, it achieves key-exposure freeness when full-fledged linearly homomorphic SPS is used. The future work is to find more applications of chameleon hash with the structurepreserving property.
